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INTERPRETING FINALITY IN § 158(D): WHETHER AN
ORDER DENYING CONFIRMATION OF A DEBTOR’S
REORGANIZATION PLAN SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FINAL
OR INTERLOCUTORY FOR THE PURPOSE OF APPEAL
ABSTRACT
A debtor appealing a bankruptcy reorganization plan to the second level of
appellate review is faced with uncertainty. The federal courts of appeals are
split over whether an order denying confirmation of a reorganization plan is
final or interlocutory for the purpose of appeal.
Two recent circuit court decisions represent this ideological split. First, on
July 1, 2013, the Fourth Circuit, in Mort Ranta v. Gorman, held, under a
flexible interpretation of finality, that a court order denying confirmation of a
debtor’s proposed reorganization plan is final for the purpose of appeal.
Second, on August 13, 2013, the Sixth Circuit, in In re Lindsey, held, under a
rigid interpretation of finality, that a court order denying confirmation of a
debtor’s proposed reorganization plan is interlocutory and, therefore, not final
for the purpose of appeal.
Congress and the Supreme Court have given little insight as to how to
interpret “finality” within 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). This uncertainty has caused
courts to perform fact-intensive inquiries that focus little on text and heavily on
policy. This Comment analyzes these policy arguments and offers an
explanation for why a flexible interpretation should be uniformly implemented
throughout the circuits.
While the circuits are still split over the finality of an order denying
confirmation of a reorganization plan, the majority of circuits interpret 28
U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) to read that the denial of a reorganization plan is an
interlocutory order, and therefore, not final for the purpose of appeal.
However, in the interest of judicial economy and the prevention of harm,
courts should interpret orders denying confirmation of reorganization plans as
final for the purpose of appeal.
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INTRODUCTION
Reorganization plans are proposed in both chapter 11 and chapter 13
proceedings.1 Debtors spend a substantial amount of time and financial
resources structuring these reorganization plans to comply with the Bankruptcy
Code (the “Code”).2 After the debtor submits its plan to a court, the court is
then tasked with either confirming or denying the plan.3 If the court confirms
the plan, the debtor can begin moving towards financial solvency.
Alternatively, a court can deny the debtor’s plan.4 Courts reach this conclusion
for various reasons.5 Critical questions about a debtor’s ability to appeal this
denial remain unanswered.
The majority of circuits hold that a court order denying confirmation of a
debtor’s reorganization plan is interlocutory and, therefore, not final for the
purpose of appeal.6 Many of these circuits come to this conclusion based on
attenuated arguments from parties such as: “[T]he debtor is free to propose
alternative plans.”7 These alternative proposed plans will be less favorable to
the debtor and will likely force the debtor to transfer more of the debtor’s
assets to the bankruptcy estate, and ultimately creditors. Courts have continued
to tighten their grasps around this concept of limited jurisdiction based on the
argument that the debtor is free to appeal the denial order once a different plan
has been confirmed.8
Forcing the debtor to wait until the end of the proceeding negatively affects
the debtor because of the increased time and financial resources the debtor is
forced to expend.9 When drafting the Code, Congress created safeguards to
1

11 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1321 (2012); see ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW

OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 396–97 (6th ed. 2009).
2 Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook,

The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics,
107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 625 (2009).
3 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1325; see WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 614.
4 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129, 1325; WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 614.
5 See, e.g., Lindsey v. Pinnacle Nat’l Bank (In re Lindsey), 726 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 2013) (denying
confirmation because the court believed the plan violated the absolute priority rule); Mort Ranta v. Gorman,
721 F.3d 241, 244 (4th Cir. 2013) (denying confirmation because the court believed the plan was unfeasible).
6 See, e.g., Bullard v. Hyde Park Sav. Bank (In re Bullard), 752 F.3d 483, 489 (1st Cir. 2014); Lindsey,
726 F.3d at 861; Lewis v. U.S., Farmers Home Admin., 992 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1993); Maiorino v.
Bradford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1982).
7 Brief for Appellee at 15, Bullard, 752 F.3d 483 (No. 13-9009); see Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 859; Simons
v. FDIC (In re Simons), 908 F.2d 643, 645 (10th Cir. 1990); Maiorino, 691 F.2d at 91.
8 See, e.g., Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 860–61; Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 246; Lewis, 992 F.2d at 773; Simons,
908 F.2d at 645.
9 Warren & Westbrook, supra note 2, at 625.

VERMETTE GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

2/17/2015 2:22 PM

INTERPRETING FINALITY IN § 158(D)

85

protect both the debtor and the creditor. For example, the debtor has an
exclusive period to file a plan.10 While Congress created the exclusivity period
as a pro-debtor device, the exclusivity period also protects creditors from a
debtor trying to prolong the proceedings.11 Once the exclusivity period expires,
the creditor is at a greater advantage because the creditor is now free to
propose a less-debtor-friendly plan.
The federal circuits are split on the finality of an order denying
confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization plan.12 Congress failed to define
“final” when drafting 28 U.S.C. § 158, the section of the U.S. Code that deals
with jurisdiction of courts to hear bankruptcy appeals.13 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has provided little insight into interpreting this section, which
has led to diametrically opposed circuits and inconsistent results across
jurisdictions.14
Two recent circuit court decisions exemplify this unsettled concept within
the bankruptcy appeals system. In Mort Ranta v. Gorman, the Fourth Circuit
held that a court order denying confirmation of a debtor’s proposed
reorganization plan was final for the purpose of appeal.15 In Lindsey v.
Pinnacle National Bank (In re Lindsey), the Sixth Circuit held that a court
order denying confirmation of a debtor’s proposed reorganization plan was
interlocutory and, therefore, not final for the purpose of appeal.16
The majority of circuits interpret § 158 to hold that the rejection of a
reorganization plan is an interlocutory order and, therefore, not final for the
purpose of appeal.17 However, in the interest of judicial economy and the
10

See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2012).
The exclusivity period acts as a check to ensure that the debtor is not using the appeal as an expensive
delaying tactic. The debtor cannot slow down the process without causing harm to himself. If the debtor does
appeal a plan he knows is unconfirmable, the debtor wastes the time allotted to him under the exclusivity
period, and once that period is expired creditors are free to propose less-debtor-friendly plans. See generally
id.
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
13 Id.
14 Compare In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 2005) (determining that final should be
interpreted flexibly based on a four factor test), with Maiorino v. Bradford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.
1981) (determining that final should be interpreted rigidly based on policy arguments).
15 721 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2013).
16 Lindsey v. Pinnacle Nat’l Bank (In re Lindsey), 726 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 2013). More recently the First
Circuit reached the same conclusion. See Bullard v. Hyde Park Sav. Bank (In re Bullard), 752 F.3d 483, 489
(1st Cir. 2014) (holding that an order denying a reorganization plan is not final for the purpose of appeal).
17 See, e.g., Bullard, 752 F.3d at 489; Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 861; Maiorino, 691 F.2d at 91; Lewis v. U.S.,
Farmers Home Admin., 992 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1993).
11
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prevention of harm, courts should interpret orders denying confirmation of
reorganization plans as final for the purpose of appeal.
Pursuant to § 158(d)(1), an individual can appeal a bankruptcy court
decision if it is final.18 This Comment addresses whether an order denying
confirmation of a debtor’s proposed reorganization plan is final pursuant to
§ 158(d)(1). It argues that allowing a debtor to appeal orders denying plan
confirmation benefits the debtor, the creditors, and the bankruptcy system as a
whole.
Part I of this Comment summarizes the process for plan confirmation, the
bankruptcy appeals structure, and the rules for determining finality. Next, Parts
II.A and II.B analyze the two main approaches courts use to determine the
finality of appealable orders: the flexible approach and the rigid approach.
Finally, Part II.C discusses the policy arguments in favor of the flexible
approach.
I. BACKGROUND
This Part begins by providing an overview of the plan confirmation
process. It then explains the bankruptcy appeals process, from the evolution of
the appellate structure to the current appeals systems. It then concludes with a
discussion of finality and provides a number of policy arguments for
determining whether an order is final.
A. The Bankruptcy System: Plan Confirmation
Debtors in bankruptcy share a common reason for filing: the inability to
meet financial obligations owed to creditors. Whether the debtor is an
individual or a public corporation, the ultimate goal of the debtor is to achieve
a state of financial solvency. For chapter 11 and chapter 13 debtors this means
obtaining confirmation of a reorganization plan.19 In fact, “plan confirmation is
surely the central measure of success in [a bankruptcy reorganization].”20 The

18 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) (“The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees entered under subsections (a) and (b) of this section.”).
19 See W. HOMER DRAKE, JR. ET AL., CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS § 12:1 (2d ed. 1998).
20 Warren & Westbrook, supra note 2, at 611–12 (“[W]e stand by the proposition that confirmation
results constitute the most important single criterion for judging the benefits of the Chapter 11 system.”).
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confirmed plan will allow the debtor to shed its financial burden and
reorganize the debt into a more manageable form.21
The plan confirmation process is lengthy and costly.22 Thus, the
“reorganization system should move cases through the system quickly . . . .”23
Plan confirmation takes an average of nine months.24 For a large corporate
debtor in chapter 11, the “average ratio of fees and expenses to assets was 2.2
percent.”25
Generally, only around thirty percent of debtors filing for chapter 11
bankruptcy will obtain plan confirmation.26 The process of creating a plan will
force out many debtors that do not have a business that can be successfully
reorganized.27 The plan negotiation stage consists of an intricate process of
“negotiations, notice, voting, confirmation hearings, and the like.”28
Reorganization plans are proposed in chapter 11 and chapter 13.29 In
chapter 13, a debtor proposes a plan to the court and the court confirms the
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2012) (“[T]he confirmation of a plan—discharges the debtor from any
debt that arose before the date of such confirmation . . . .”); Warren & Westbrook, supra note 2, at 610.
22 See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 2, at 625 (“The problem of costs is often overstated, but cost
remain substantial nonetheless. . . . In addition, the time spent in bankruptcy itself leads to the loss of value,
comprising an indirect cost.”).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 629. The size of the debtor has little effect on the amount of time it takes a chapter 11 case to
progress to plan confirmation. Id. at 637.

There is no significant difference between the length of time to confirm a plan of reorganization
for debtors with above median debt and the length of time to confirm a plan for their below
median counterparts. The same is true when the dividing line is mean debt rather than median
debt.
Id. at 637 n.113.
25 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 405 (“While these percentages seem small, the absolute
values can be quite high. In Enron, for example, professional fees alone approached a billion dollars with the
case far from over.”).
26 Id. at 399.
27 See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 2, at 631–32. While researching a sample of cases filed eight
years apart, the authors came to the conclusion that “the reorganization system was sorting out the winners
from the losers in reasonably short periods of time” and that “[f]rom the viewpoint of these exit cases, the
system’s performance was remarkably quick.” Id. The process of plan creation alone can force the debtor out
of the system because of the financial burden it imposes on debtors: “There might have been a perfect solution
lurking out there for the business, but finding that solution could cost more than the business could afford.” Id.
at 619. Additionally, attempting to create a plan might shed light on the actual state of the business: “[O]nce
their bankruptcy lawyer or someone else helped them understand just how much trouble the business was in,
those in control of the business realized there was no hope.” Id.
28 Id. at 632.
29 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121, 1321 (2012); see WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 396–97.
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plan as long as the plan meets the requirements of the Code.30 Bankruptcy
reorganization in chapter 11 adds another dimension to the process: plan
voting.31 Plan voting makes the chapter 11 process longer and more intricate to
navigate.32 The ultimate goal of a chapter 11 reorganization is the “acceptance
of a financial plan by majorities of each class of creditors.”33 As parties
negotiate an acceptable plan, the negotiation process places an additional
burden on the debtor by extending the cost and time to proceed through the
system. Each time the debtor is forced back into the plan creation process, the
temporal and financial burden imposed on an already burdened debtor is
increased.34
B. The Bankruptcy System: Appeals
The Constitution gives Congress the ability to establish a uniform
bankruptcy law throughout the nation.35 Therefore, bankruptcy cases are
subject to federal jurisdiction and begin in the federal court system.36 Under 28
U.S.C. § 157(a),37 a system of federal bankruptcy judges is established within
the federal district court system.38 While bankruptcy judges are regulated under
Article I, federal district court judges derive their power under Article III.39
This difference between the sources of authority from which bankruptcy and
federal judges derive their powers impacts the type of decisions each may
render and changes the structure of appeals.40
Congress bifurcated judicial bankruptcy power into two categories under
28 U.S.C. § 157.41 First, bankruptcy judges can both hear and determine “core

30

See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 396–97.
Id.
32 See id.
33 Id. at 616.
34 See id. at 405.
35 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (“[The Congress shall have Power] to establish . . . uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”).
36 Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal—Use of the New 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), 84 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 145, 146 (2010).
37 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2012) (“Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any
or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the
bankruptcy judges for the district.”).
38 Bartell, supra note 36, at 146.
39 Id.
40 Id. (“[B]ankruptcy judges are not Article III judges, and therefore do not have the Constitutional
authority to hear and determine state law causes of action . . . .”).
41 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). Section 158 discusses the jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges, stating:
31
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proceedings.”42 Section 157(b)(2) does not define the term core proceedings
but rather presents a non-exclusive list of issues that fall into the category.43
Furthermore, in drafting § 157(b), Congress did not limit the bankruptcy
judge’s power to hear and determine issues in core proceedings.44 Therefore,
when deciding core proceedings the bankruptcy court has the power to issue
final orders and judgments.45 Confirmation of bankruptcy reorganization plans
are considered core proceedings and, therefore, bankruptcy judges have the
power to issue confirmation orders as final orders.46
Second, bankruptcy judges may hear, but not rule on, “non-core
proceedings.”47 Bankruptcy judges may only submit findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the federal district court, and then the district court issues
a final order after considering the bankruptcy court’s findings.48 After the

Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceedings
arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11, referred under subsection (a) of this
section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of
this title.
Id.

42

Id.
See id.
44 See generally id. § 157(b).
45 Id. § 157(b)(1); Bartell, supra note 36, at 146; cf. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (finding
that some core proceedings exceed the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction because they violate Article III’s
delegation of power to the judiciary).
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (2)(L). Section 157(b)(2) defines the type of proceedings that Congress
intended to be core proceedings, including § 157 (b)(2)(L) which states that confirmation of plans are core
proceedings.
47 See id. § 157. Congress failed to define core and non-core proceedings and “[c]ourts rarely shed light
on this confusion with the definitions they have chosen to use; instead, courts typically rely on the vague
statutory language or a generally understood meaning of the terms.” Jason C. Matson, Comment, Running
Circles Around Marathon? The Effect of Accounts Receivable as Core or Noncore Proceedings on the Article
III Courts, 20 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 451, 452 (2004). Congress provided a list of proceedings that qualify as
core proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 157. While this list is not exhaustive, since the statute only describes core
and non-core proceedings, proceedings that do not fall into the core proceeding category would be considered
non-core proceedings. See id.
48 Id. § 157(c)(1).
43

A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but that is otherwise
related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall
be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge’s proposed findings and
conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely and
specifically objected.
Id.
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district court has issued a final order or judgment on the issue, the losing party
may appeal the decision directly to the appropriate court of appeals.49
Additionally, the federal court system’s appeals structure differs from that
of the bankruptcy court system.50 First, the number of bankruptcy cases that
actually get appealed through the bankruptcy system is much lower than nonbankruptcy matters appealed to the federal appellate system, as Figure 1
demonstrates.
Figure 1

Civil and Criminal Cases Filed in Federal District
Court51
Civil and Criminal Cases Appealed from the
District Court to the Courts of Appeals52
Total Bankruptcy Petitions Filed in Bankruptcy
Courts53
Total Bankruptcy Appeals to the District Courts
and BAPs54
Total Bankruptcy Appeals to
the United States Court of Appeals55

2011

2012

392,183

372,563

42,931

44,034

1,467,221

1,261,140

3,312

3,219

683

811

Per Figure 1, in 2011 bankruptcy appeals made up 1.6% of the total appeals
filed with the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, and in 2012, that number rose
49

Bartell, supra note 36, at 145.
Id.
51
Thomas F. Hogan, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2012: Judicial Caseload
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/judicial-caseloadIndicators,
U.S. COURTS,
indicators.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2014).
52 Thomas F. Hogan, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2012: U.S. Courts of Appeals,
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/us-courts-of-appeals.aspx (last visited
Dec. 16, 2014).
53 Thomas F. Hogan, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2012: U.S. Bankruptcy Courts,
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/us-bankruptcy-courts.aspx (last
visited Dec. 16, 2014).
54 Thomas F. Hogan, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2012: Table C-2A, U.S.
COURTS [hereinafter Hogan, Table C-2A], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/
appendices/C02ASep12.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2014) (noting 2227 bankruptcy cases filed in 2011 and 2168
filed in 2012); Thomas F. Hogan, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business 2012: Table B-10, U.S.
COURTS [hereinafter Hogan, Table B-10], http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/
appendices/B10Sep12.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2014) (noting 1085 cases filed in BAPs in 2011 and 1051 filed
in 2012).
55 Hogan, supra note 52.
50
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slightly to 1.8%.56 Despite the large number of bankruptcy petitions filed each
year, less than 0.1% of cases are appealed to the circuit courts.57
Second, in the federal court system there is a single level of appeal—a
party can appeal directly to the applicable court of appeals.58 The bankruptcy
system differs from the federal system by having a dual system of appeals: the
district court and the circuit court.59 The reason for this different treatment can
be attributed to the structure and the organization of the bankruptcy court
system.60
C. A Brief History of the Evolving Appeals Process
The two-tiered approach to the bankruptcy appeals process has been
present and modified throughout the history of bankruptcy law.61 Under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, parties dissatisfied with decisions of the bankruptcy
“referees” could seek review by the federal district courts, but only after the
district court rendered a decision could the parties appeal to the court of
appeals.62
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, bankruptcy courts gained more
autonomous power.63 While the federal district courts would still hear appeals
on final orders from the bankruptcy courts, the discretion to hear appeals was
eliminated.64 Congress also created the option of establishing bankruptcy

56 See id. (dividing the number of bankruptcy appeals to the circuit courts by the total number of civil and
criminal appeals to the circuit court from the district court).
57 In 2011, only 0.04% of bankruptcy petitions resulted in an appeal to the circuit court; in 2012, only
0.06% were appealed. Hogan, supra note 53; Hogan, supra note 52.
58 Bartell, supra note 36, at 146 (“[A] party seeking review of a final judgment appeals directly to the
court of appeals for the applicable circuit . . . .”).
59 Id. at 147.
60 See id.
61 See generally id. (providing a more in-depth analysis of the evolution of the bankruptcy system).
62 Id. at 148.
63 See id. at 150. For a more in-depth analysis of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 see Richard B.
Levin, Bankruptcy Appeals, 58 N.C. L. REV. 967 (1980).
64 See Suburban Bank of Cary Grove v. Riggsby (In re Riggsby), 745 F.2d 1153, 1154 (7th Cir. 1984).

However, we think it reasonably clear that the dismissal by the bankruptcy judge of a complaint
objecting to the discharge of the bankrupt is final. The proceeding that such a complaint kicks off
has traditionally been treated as a separate adversary proceeding within the framework of the
overall bankruptcy . . . Congress in overhauling the system of bankruptcy appeals in the 1978 act
apparently meant to continue the former practice whereby orders disposing of such proceedings
were appealable as final orders.
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appellate panels (“BAPs”) which, if a circuit wished, could hear appeals from
the bankruptcy court instead of the district court.65 Additionally, the 1978 Act
added the notion that if both parties consented, they could appeal directly to
the court of appeals from the bankruptcy court.66
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 further
changed the structure of the system and removed the parties’ abilities to
consent to a direct appeal to the court of appeals.67 Under these modifications,
BAPs remained an alternative to sending appeals to the district court; however,
certain conditions were established.68 One theory for why Congress removed
the direct appeal by consent is that “Congress was concerned that allowing an
appeal before a final decision has been rendered by an Article III judge might
somehow be unconstitutional.”69
Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Congress set up a review
commission that was given two years to investigate problems with the Code.70
One of the issues the commission reviewed was the appellate structure of the
bankruptcy courts.71 The commission issued its findings in 1997 and
recommended Congress eliminate “‘the first layer of review’ to the district
court or bankruptcy appellate panel from bankruptcy court orders.”72 While
Congress sought to pass legislation providing a form of direct appeal, President
Clinton eventually vetoed the legislation.73

Id. at 1154 (citing Saco Local Dev. Corp., 711 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1983)). The sections of the judicial code
“added by the new law, govern appeals under the Bankruptcy Code. Sections 1334 and 1482 provide
mandatory appellate jurisdiction (appeals as of right) to the district courts . . . .” Levin, supra note 63, at 967.
65 Bartell, supra note 36, at 150–51.
66 Id. (“[T]he courts of appeals were to be given jurisdiction over direct bankruptcy appeals from the new
bankruptcy courts with the agreement of the parties to the appeal.”).
67 See id. at 151–52.
68 See id. at 152. The conditions were satisfied “if the district judges in the applicable district authorize[d]
such appeals . . . and then only if the parties elect[ed] to appeal to the BAP rather than to the district
court . . . .” Id.
69 Id.
70 See id. This was the first major change to bankruptcy law in ten years. See id.
71 Id. at 153.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 154.
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The final major congressional change to the bankruptcy appeals procedure
took effect with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).74 BAPCPA transformed the
appeals process into the procedure the bankruptcy court system is bound by
today.75 Professors Jonathan Remy Nash and Rafael I. Pardo illustrate this
pathway in Rethinking the Principle-Agent Theory of Judging, depicted below
as Figure 2.
Figure 276

D. Current Methods to Appeal a Bankruptcy Court Decision
Since the passage of BAPCPA, the controlling authority for appealing an
initial determination from the bankruptcy court is 28 U.S.C. § 158.77 Congress
74

Id. at 155.
See id. at 154.
76 Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, Rethinking the Principle-Agent Theory of Judging, 99 IOWA
L. REV. 331, 341 (2013).
75
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created two levels of intermediate review for bankruptcy appeals.78 First, under
first-tier intermediate review, appeals of initial determinations can be heard by
federal district courts, BAPs, or federal circuit courts.79 Second, under secondtier intermediate review, parties can appeal the decisions of the federal district
courts and BAPs to the applicable federal circuit court.80
When appealing an initial determination for first-tier intermediate review,
appeals can be heard by federal district courts, BAPs, or federal circuit
courts.81 First, under § 158(a), a debtor may appeal an initial determination to
the federal district court.82 Federal district courts can hear three types of
appeals: “(1) from final judgments, orders, and decrees; (2) from interlocutory
orders and decrees . . . ; and (3) with leave of the court, from other
interlocutory orders and decrees . . . .”83 These appeals to the federal district
courts are represented as Path 1 in Figure 2.
Second, a debtor may appeal an initial determination to a BAP.84
Section 158(b)–(c) establishes standards for creating BAPs and appealing
decisions from those panels.85 If the circuit has created a BAP, § 158(b) and (c)
allow a debtor to appeal an initial determination directly to the BAP.86 These
appeals to BAPs are represented as Path 2 in Figure 2.
Third, a debtor can appeal an initial determination through the recently
added §158(d)(2)(A), otherwise known as certification.87 Under
§ 158(d)(2)(A), the federal circuit court can obtain jurisdiction to hear direct
appeals for initial determinations “if the court of appeals authorizes the direct
appeal of the judgment, order, or decree” and one of the three following factors
is met:
77

See 28 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the
Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1753 (2008).
79 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (stating that the district court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from initial
determinations); id. § 158(b)(1) (stating that BAPs have jurisdiction to hear appeals from initial
determinations); id. § 158(d)(2)(A) (stating that federal circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals, if the
requirements of certification are met).
80 Id. § 158(d)(1) (stating that federal circuit courts have jurisdiction to hear appeals from all “final
decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees”).
81 Id. § 158(a), (b)(1), (d)(2)(A).
82 Id. § 158(a).
83 Id.
84 Id. § 158(b)(1).
85 Id. § 158(b)–(c).
86 See id.
87 Id. § 158(d)(2)(A); see Ben L. Mesches, Bankruptcy Appeals, 45 TEX. J. BUS. L. 107, 109–10 (2013).
78
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(i) the judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law as to
which there is no controlling decision of the court of appeals for the
circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United States, or involves a
matter of public importance;
(ii) the judgment, order, or decree involves a question of law
requiring resolution of conflicting decisions; or
(iii) an immediate appeal from the judgment, order, or decree may
materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which
the appeal is taken . . . .88

Additionally, the issue must be certified by one of the following: the lower
level bankruptcy court, the federal district court, the BAP, or jointly by the
parties.89 These direct appeals to the federal circuit court are represented as
Path 3 in Figure 2.90
When appealing a decision for second-tier intermediate review, from firsttier intermediate review, § 158(d)(1) controls.91 Section 158(d)(1), states that
the federal circuit court can hear appeals from “all final decisions, judgments,
orders, and decrees.”92 These appeals to the federal circuit courts are
represented as Paths 4 in Figure 2.
While there are other ways that debtors can reach the second-tier appellate
level,93 including certification,94 this Comment specifically focuses on Path 4,
the second-tier appellate review, i.e., appeals to the circuit court from the
district court or BAP.

88

28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).
Id.
90 See generally Mesches, supra note 87.
91 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
92 Id.
93 Not represented in Figure 2 are certain bankruptcy proceedings that originate in the district court that
are not bound by 28 U.S.C. § 158. See Sarah E. Vickers, Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in Bankruptcy
Cases: The Conflict Between Judicial Code Sections 158 and 1292, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 519, 521 (1991). Under
these circumstances a debtor can look to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292 to appeal directly to the federal circuit
court. Congress has provided far more guidance on how to interpret finality in this non-bankruptcy setting. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b); Vickers, supra, at 521.
94 Vickers, supra note 93, at 524 (“[T]he general rule is that courts should grant leave ‘sparingly, since
interlocutory bankruptcy appeals should be the exception, rather than the rule.’” (internal citations omitted)
(quoting U.S. Tr. v. PHM Credit Corp. (In re PHM Credit Corp.), 99 B.R. 762, 767 (E.D. Mich. 1989))).
89
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E. Determining Finality
The question of finality is not as clear-cut as one might assume. When
determining whether an order denying confirmation of a debtor’s proposed
reorganization plan is a final, appealable order, the federal circuit court’s first
step is to analyze the plain meaning of the statute.95 While 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)
requires that an order be final for the purpose of appeal, Congress neglected to
define the term final.96 In fact, of the 8,224 words Congress used in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101, the word final is only used once and provides no insight into Congress’s
intent.97
The Supreme Court has previously noted that due to the plethora of
changes involved when the bankruptcy system is modified, it is inappropriate
to look beyond the text of the Code.98 Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term
final order as “[a]n order that is dispositive of the entire case.”99 Under a plain
meaning analysis, an order denying confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization
plan would most likely not qualify as an appealable order. Nevertheless, while
the majority of courts100 have reached similar conclusions, the route taken to

95

E.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
We must begin our inquiry with the plain language of the statute. As the Supreme Court has
noted, “[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the ‘rare cases [in
which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the
intention of its drafters.’”

In re Cont’l Airlines, 932 F.2d 282, 287 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242).
96 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d).
97 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The word final is used exactly one time in 11 U.S.C § 101, in the
definition of settlement payment: “The term ‘settlement payment’ means . . . a preliminary settlement
payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a final
settlement payment, a net settlement payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the forward
contract trade.” Id. § 101(51A).
98 In re Cont’l Airlines, 932 F.2d at 287.
With respect to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “in
such a substantial overhaul of the system, it is not appropriate or realistic to expect Congress to
have explained with particularity each step it took. Rather, as long as the statutory scheme is
coherent and consistent, there is generally no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain
language of the statute.”
Id. (quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 240–41).
99 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
100 See, e.g., Lindsey v. Pinnacle Nat’l Bank (In re Lindsey), 726 F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2013); Maiorino
v. Bradford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1982).
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get to this conclusion focuses heavily on policy and little on statutory text.101
Therefore, in order to understand how courts interpret finality, it is important
to look at the vastly different fact-intensive policy judgments courts make
when adjudicating the issue.
In Catlin v. United States, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether
a condemnation proceeding was final for the purpose of appeal.102 Here, the
Supreme Court defined a final order as “one which ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”103
While some courts have broadened the definition of finality since the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Catlin, the majority of courts still apply the “ends the
litigation” standard in some way.104
Congress’s failure to define the term final in this bankruptcy context has
forced courts to conduct fact-intensive inquiries based on “judicial economy
and prevention of harm.”105 There are six major policy arguments, all of which
are derived from Congress’s intent to foster judicial economy and prevent
harm.106 The six policy arguments are (1) greater efficiency; (2) the possibility
that an appeal will not be required; (3) a broader scope of review; (4) faster
resolution; (5) preservation of the trial judge’s authority; and (6) preventing the
use of interlocutory appeals as an expensive delaying tactic.107
The Supreme Court addressed the first of these policy concerns, efficiency,
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.108 In Cohen, the Supreme Court
was tasked with resolving whether an order determining a right to security was
final in a shareholder derivative action.109 The Court stated that an “[a]ppeal
gives the upper court a power of review, not one of intervention. So long as the
matter remains open, unfinished or inconclusive, there may be no intrusion by

101

See, e.g., Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 859 (deciding the case based on various policy factors including greater
efficiency, faster resolution, the fact that appeal may not be required, and preserving the trial judge’s
authority).
102 See 324 U.S. 229, 234 (1945).
103 Vickers, supra note 93, at 523 (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. 229).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Muniz, 540 F.3d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 2008) (expanding the ends-the-litigation
standard to ask whether “the ruling involved is fundamental to the future conduct of the case” (quoting United
States v. 101.88 Acres of Land, 616 F.2d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 1980))).
105 Vickers, supra note 93, at 523.
106 See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 22, 148 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
107, 207.
107 Vickers, supra note 93, at 523.
108 Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
109 337 U.S. at 546.
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appeal.”110 This view runs parallel to the sentiment expressed in Catlin.111 The
Court further reiterated the views expressed in Catlin by stating that “the
purpose [of consolidating issues for appeal] is to combine in one review all
stages of the proceeding that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and
when final judgment results.”112 Here, the Court claimed that it is more
efficient to defer all excess litigation, such as appealing interlocutory matters,
to the absolute end of the case.113
However, the Court created an important exception to this general rule. It
held that the order determining a right to security was final and appealable.114
The Court stated that, “when [the time for appeal] comes, it will be too late
effectively to review the present order and the rights conferred by the statute, if
it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably.”115 The Court relaxed
the rule established in Catlin because “[t]his decision appears to fall in that
small class which finally determine claims of right . . . too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”116 The Court
acknowledged that in some instances it would be inefficient to wait until the
end of a case to determine an issue “separable from, and collateral to, rights
asserted in the action.”117
The second policy argument used by courts is that an appeal may not be
required.118 The Seventh Circuit relied on this policy in Suburban Bank of
Cary Grove v. Riggsby (In re Riggsby).119 In that case, the court was tasked
with determining whether a court order remanding a proceeding from the
district court to the bankruptcy court was a final order.120 The court noted:
If a district judge remanded a case for further proceedings that would
take a week to complete, and the remand order was appealable and
was upheld on appeal, a year or more might elapse before the
proceedings on remand were concluded. Yet if those proceedings had
110

Id.
See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1945).
112 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 546–47.
115 Id. at 546.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Vickers, supra note 93, at 523 (citing In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d 26, 29 (1st
Cir. 1988)).
119 Suburban Bank of Cary Grove v. Riggsby (In re Riggsby), 745 F.2d 1153, 1154 (7th Cir. 1984).
120 Id.
111
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been conducted without this interruption, then, depending on their
outcome, there might be no appeal at all . . . .121

Thus, the court took a wait-and-see approach.122 The outcome of the
proceeding might be subject to change, but the court wanted to wait and see if
the negotiations with creditors were sufficiently developed that the case was
ripe for appeal.123 A debtor that has gone through the process of formulating
and negotiating a subsequent reorganization plan may be deterred from
appealing the original, more beneficial plan, because of the tediousness of the
process.124
The third policy argument courts consider when interpreting finality is the
“broader scope of review” argument.125 In Taylor v. Board of Education, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was tasked with determining the finality of an
order refusing to modify an injunction.126 The circuit court reasoned that by
taking an appeal before the ultimate conclusion of the case, it would be making
its determination before the lower court fully developed the record.127 The
court stated, “[W]e think more informed consideration would show that the
balance of advantage lies in withholding such review until the proceedings in
the District Court are completed.”128 The court went even further and claimed
that it would rather “consider the decision of the District Court, not in pieces
but as a whole, not as an abstract declaration inviting the contest of one theory
against another, but in the concrete.”129 By arguing for a broader scope of
review, the court positioned itself to consider only final cases completed by the
lower court and justified this decision through the arguments of judicial
economy130 and prevention of harm.131

121 Id. at 1155–56. The court additionally contributed to the judicial economy argument by stating that if
the appeal was allowed there would be potential for even more appeals and “in any event there would be no
chance of two appeals—one from the order of remand and the other from whatever order the district judge
entered on appeal from the bankruptcy judge’s final decision following remand.” Id. at 1156.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See id. at 1155–56.
125 Vickers, supra note 93, at 523 (citing Taylor v. Bd. of Educ., 288 F.2d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1961)).
126 288 F.2d at 602.
127 Id. at 605.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See id. (“[It] would not be conducive to . . . the conclusion of this controversy with speed consistent
with order, which the Supreme Court has directed and ought to be the objective of all concerned.”).
131 See id.
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The fourth policy argument that courts consider when interpreting finality
is the “faster resolution argument.”132 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Magic Circle Energy 1981–A Drilling Program v. Lindsey (In re Magic Circle
Energy Corp.) was faced with determining whether the denial of an application
for a writ of prohibition was final for the purpose of appeal.133 In making its
determination, the court justified applying the Catlin standard of interpreting
finality because it would result in a faster resolution of the case.134 The court
stated that the Catlin method of finality “furthers the policy underlying the
finality doctrine by controlling piecemeal adjudication and eliminating delays
caused by interlocutory appeals.”135 The court reasoned that this faster
resolution, coupled with the fact that the “[a]ppellants’ remedy is to challenge
the bankruptcy court’s exercise of jurisdiction by bringing an appeal from the
final judgment ultimately rendered by that court,” fostered judicial economy
and the prevention of harm and therefore, it was not necessary for the order to
be final.136
The fifth policy argument courts consider when determining finality is that
it “preserves the trial judge’s authority.”137 In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
the Supreme Court determined whether an order denying class certification is a
final order for the purpose of appeal.138 The Court was concerned that allowing
interlocutory orders to be appealed would “authorize[] indiscriminate
interlocutory review of decisions made by the trial judge.”139 The Court stated
that Congress created interlocutory orders to prevent this “indiscriminate
interlocutory review” and that “[a] party seeking review of a nonfinal order
must first obtain the consent of the trial judge.”140 The Court further stated,
“The screening procedure serves the dual purpose of ensuring that such review
will be confined to appropriate cases and avoiding time-consuming
jurisdictional determinations in the court of appeals.”141

132 Vickers, supra note 93, at 521 (citing Magic Circle Energy 1981–A Drilling Program v. Lindsey (In re
Magic Circle Energy Corp.), 889 F.2d 950, 953 (10th Cir. 1989)).
133 889 F.2d at 953.
134 Id.
135 Id. (citing In re Commercial Contractors, Inc., 771 F.2d 1373, 1375 (10th Cir. 1985)).
136 Id.
137 Vickers, supra note 93, at 523 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978)).
138 437 U.S. at 474.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 474–75.
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The sixth policy argument courts use is the concern that debtor will use
interlocutory appeals as “an expensive delaying tactic.”142 In In re Recticel
Foam Corp., the First Circuit Court of Appeals had to decide whether a case
management order was final for the purpose of appeal.143 The court stated that
“[t]he finality rule, after all, was designed to conserve judicial energy and
eliminate the ‘delay, harassment and cost’ that would result from a barrage of
interlocutory appeals.”144 The court was concerned with the threat of appellants
using interlocutory appeals to slow down the judicial process.145 The court
stated,
It would disserve the proper relationship between trial and appellate
courts in the federal system, and wreak havoc with the taxing
demands of modern-day case management, were the court of appeals
gratuitously to inject itself as a super-navigator of sorts, secondguessing the district court from turn to turn as that tribunal wended its
way through the thickets and brambles of complex litigation. To do
so, we suggest, would be to concentrate on the trees at the expense of
a balanced vision of the forest.146

The court believed that allowing the appeal to continue as final would lead to
lowered judicial economy and cause more harm than it prevented.147
II. PROOF OF CLAIM
Two recent circuit court decisions have reached different results on the
question of whether an order denying confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization
plan is final for the purpose of appeal. In Mort Ranta v. Gorman, the Fourth
Circuit held that a court order denying confirmation of a debtor’s proposed
reorganization plan was final for the purpose of appeal.148 In In re Lindsey, the
Sixth Circuit held that a court order denying confirmation of a debtor’s
proposed reorganization plan was interlocutory and, therefore, not final for the
purpose of appeal.149

142

Vickers, supra note 93, at 523 (quoting In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1006 (1st Cir.

1988)).
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

See 859 F.2d at 1003.
Id. at 1006 (quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) § 25.1 (1985)).
See id.
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1006.
721 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2013).
726 F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2013).
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The courts in both cases struggled with the question of whether they had
jurisdiction to hear the appeals.150 A court of appeals “is obligated to raise such
jurisdictional issues on its own if it perceives any.”151 As one court stated, “It
is too elementary to warrant citation of authority that a court has an obligation
to inquire sua sponte into its subject matter jurisdiction, and to proceed no
further if such jurisdiction is wanting.”152 The same court stated, “No matter
how tantalizing a problem may be, a federal appellate court cannot scratch
intellectual itches unless it has jurisdiction to reach them.”153 If the circuit
court determines that the order is interlocutory, it lacks jurisdiction and must
dismiss the appeal.154 Alternatively, if the court finds that the order is final, it
can proceed with reviewing the appeal.155
When determining whether an order denying confirmation of a debtor’s
reorganization plan is final for the purpose of appeal, courts engage in lengthy,
fact-intensive decision-making. Courts generally take one of two approaches:
the flexible approach or the rigid approach. The flexible approach interprets
finality more leniently for bankruptcy appeals to conclude that orders denying
reorganization plans are final and appealable.156 In contrast, the rigid approach
utilizes a strict Catlin standard, analyzing finality traditionally, and leading to
the conclusion that orders denying reorganization plans are interlocutory and
not appealable.157
Due to the fact-intensive nature of judicial decision-making, even those
circuits that agree on finality reach these conclusions through different
methods.158 The following Parts will explore both the flexible and the rigid
approaches to determining finality. The interpretations will be examined
through six finality policy arguments to ultimately demonstrate how the
flexible approach leads to a more efficient outcome for both the debtor and the
creditor.

150

See Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 858–59; Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 246.
Lewis v. U.S., Farmers Home Admin., 992 F.2d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 1993).
152 Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d at 1002.
153 Id. (citing Director, OWCP v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 853 F.2d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1988)).
154 See Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 861.
155 See Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 246.
156 See id. at 247.
157 See Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 859–61.
158 Compare In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 2005) (determining that final should be
interpreted flexibly based on a four-factor test), with Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 243 (concluding the same based
on policy arguments).
151
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A. Flexible Approach Determining that the Court’s Denial of a Debtor’s
Proposed Reorganization Plan Is Final for the Purposes of Appeal
This Part begins with a discussion and analysis of the general flexible
approach to interpreting finality employed in a recent case, Mort Ranta v.
Gorman, in which the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an order
denying confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization plan is final.159 Following a
discussion of Mort Ranta, this Part explores the court decisions that influenced
the Mort Ranta decision. This Part then concludes with an analysis of decisions
where courts utilized a flexible approach but adopted it through a
methodological framework.
1. General Flexible Approach to Interpreting Finality
Courts that take a flexible approach to interpreting finality rely on more
lenient interpretations of finality to find that plan denial orders are final.160 In
Mort Ranta, the Fourth Circuit addressed the question of whether it had
jurisdiction over an appeal based on whether the denial of the debtor’s
reorganization plan was final or interlocutory.161 The court in Mort Ranta held
that an order denying confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization plan is a final,
appealable order.162
In Mort Ranta, a debtor attempted to exclude Social Security income from
his projected disposable income.163 The chapter 13 trustee objected to the
debtor’s proposed plan because unsecured creditors would be paid back less
than one percent of the debt.164 If Social Security income was included then
unsecured creditors would “get paid pretty much in full like everybody
else.”165 The lower bankruptcy court held that the debtor’s plan was not
feasible.166
The debtor petitioned the bankruptcy court to grant an interlocutory appeal
but the court denied the request and subsequently denied confirmation of the
debtor’s reorganization plan.167 The debtor appealed the order to the district
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

721 F.3d at 243–46.
See id. at 247.
See id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id. at 244.
Id. (referring to the trustee’s statements).
Id.
Id.
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court.168 The district court ruled against the debtor without addressing the
jurisdictional issues.169 The debtor then appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.170
Before the Fourth Circuit could address the legal issues, the court first
analyzed whether it possessed the necessary appellate jurisdiction to hear the
case, asking whether an order denying confirmation of a debtor’s
reorganization plan is final.171 The court introduced the issue by stating that,
unlike other circuits, the Fourth Circuit has a long history of allowing debtors
to appeal orders denying confirmation of reorganization plans.172 The court
also noted that this conclusion was similar to its holdings that creditors can
appeal court decisions that have overruled objections to reorganization
plans.173
The court began its analysis by discussing different interpretations of
finality that exist within bankruptcy law and then analyzed the “greater
efficiency” and “faster resolution” policy arguments.174 The court reasoned
that “the concept of finality in bankruptcy traditionally has been applied in a
‘more pragmatic and less technical way,’” and stressed the notion of
interpreting flexibility into § 158(d)(1)’s finality requirement.175 The court
stated that “bankruptcy proceedings are often protracted, involving multiple
parties, claims, and procedures” and that “postponing review of discrete
portions of the action until after a plan of reorganization is approved could
result in the waste of valuable time and scarce resources.”176 This efficiency
argument is diametrically opposed to the efficiency argument used by courts
that take the rigid approach to disallow appeals for plan denials.177

168

Id.
Id. at 245.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id. (“[W]e have a long history of allowing appeals from debtors whose proposed plans are denied
confirmation, without questioning the finality of the underlying order.”) (emphasis added); see, e.g., In re
Quigley, 673 F.3d 269, 270 (4th Cir. 2012).
173 Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 245 (“When a bankruptcy debtor’s proposed plan is confirmed, we have
generally allowed creditors and trustees whose objections to the plan were overruled to appeal as a matter of
right.”); see, e.g., Quigley, 673 F.3d at 270.
174 See Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 245.
175 Id. at 246 (citing McDow v. Dudley, 662 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2011)).
176 Id.
177 Compare Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 246–49, with Lindsey v. Pinnacle Nat’l Bank (In re Lindsey), 726
F.3d 857, 859–61 (6th Cir. 2013) (In Mort Ranta the court believed that interpreting the plan deal as final was
“hardly less economical, for it simply delays the inevitable in cases where the amended plan is unacceptable to
169
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In its analysis, the court also looked at how courts dealing with finality in
other areas of bankruptcy law interpreted the term and utilized the broader
scope of review policy argument.178 The foundation of the court’s decision
focused on whether the order “finally dispose[s] of discrete disputes within the
larger case.”179 Eventually, the court held that final orders “resolve a specific
dispute within the larger case without dismissing the entire action or resolving
all other issues.”180 The court gave examples such as the denial of a trustee’s
motion to dismiss an abusive bankruptcy case181 or the denial of a request by a
claimant to appoint a trustee.182 Alternatively, the court held interlocutory
orders “are provisional in nature and subject to revision.”183 The court
reasoned that since the order dismissed the debtor’s reorganization plan there
was nothing remaining for the bankruptcy court to determine.184
Additionally, the court discussed the policy argument that an appeal would
not be required.185 The court disagreed with other circuits that have held that
orders denying confirmation of reorganization plans are interlocutory “simply
because the debtor may propose an amended plan.”186 The court explained that
even a confirmed plan that is considered final for the purpose of appeal can be
altered by the debtor such that it would “substantially modify the terms of
repayment and the rights of creditors.”187 The court held that the dismissal of a
debtor’s reorganization plan is a final appealable order and this conclusion “is
all but compelled by considerations of practicality.”188
The Mort Ranta decision was not the first instance in which a circuit relied
on the flexible approach to determine that an order denying confirmation of a
debtor’s reorganization plan was final.189 While in the minority, other circuits
the debtor,” while in Lindsey the court believed interpreting the appeal as final would lead to wasted time and
resources).
178 See Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 246 (quoting In re Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 407 F.3d 656, 660 (4th
Cir. 2005)).
179 Id. (quoting McDow, 662 F.3d at 286–90).
180 Id. (citing McDow, 662 F.3d at 286–90).
181 Id. (citing Comm. of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 828 F.2d 239, 241 (4th Cir.
1987)).
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 248.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. (quoting Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir.
2000)).
189 See, e.g., Bartee, 212 F.3d 277.
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have concluded similarly based on judicial economy and the prevention of
harm.190
Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass’n (In re Bartee) is a Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals case that involved a chapter 13 debtor whose plan was denied
confirmation because of a dispute regarding the secured status of a creditor.191
The court began its analysis by stating that it had “jurisdiction over this case
only to the extent that the judgments below are considered ‘final’ within the
meaning of § 158(d) or § 1291.”192
The court reasoned that “‘finality’ for the purposes of bankruptcy appeals
under § 158(d) is considered more liberally or flexibly than ‘finality’ under
§ 1291 . . . .”193 The court believed that § 158(d) provided a less-rigid standard
and found that appeals in bankruptcy, which otherwise would be considered
interlocutory, could be final to the extent that the decision “constitute[d] either
a ‘final determination of the rights of the parties to secure the relief they seek,’
or a final disposition ‘of a discrete dispute within the larger bankruptcy case
for the order to be considered final.’”194
The court also argued for the flexible interpretation because the court
considered it to be the practical approach.195 The foundation for considering
practicality rested in the court’s understanding of the significance of the
decision to confirm or deny a reorganization plan.196 This is reflected in the
court’s statement: “[H]ere, one independent decision materially affects the rest
of the bankruptcy proceedings.”197 The court believed that because the order
denying a debtor’s reorganization plan has such a large impact on the entire
bankruptcy proceeding, courts should interpret finality more flexibly to allow
the debtor to the appeal the order.198 Additionally, the court relied on the
potential that an appeal will not be required.199 The court refuted the
proposition that an order denying confirmation is interlocutory simply because
the debtor could propose a new plan.200 The court feared that disallowing
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

See, e.g., id.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 281.
Id. (quoting IRS v. Orr (In re Orr), 180 F.3d 656, 659 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Id. at 282–83.
Id. at 282.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 283.
Id.
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appeal of a plan denial would lead the debtor to an illogical conclusion in
which the debtor would choose “[f]iling an unwanted or involuntary plan and
then appealing his own plan . . . .”201 The court stated, “Often an appeal is the
only reasonable course, since the debtor is left without any real options in
formulating his plan.”202
2. Methodological Flexible Approach to Interpreting Finality
While the court in Bartee qualified the impact of its decision,203 other
courts have expanded on the idea of flexibility in interpreting finality for
orders denying reorganization plans.204 In re Armstrong World Industries
involved the denial of a chapter 11 reorganization plan.205 There, the court
made the same basic assumption the Bartee court made—that finality for the
purpose of bankruptcy cases should be treated differently than finality for the
purposes of civil cases.206
In analyzing whether to consider a plan denial order final, the court in
Armstrong stated, “Because bankruptcy proceedings are often protracted, and
time and resources can be wasted if an appeal is delayed until after a final
disposition, our policy has been to quickly resolve issues central to the
progress of a bankruptcy.”207 The court took a methodological approach and
created a system of four factors for use when analyzing whether an order
should be considered final.208
The first factor the Armstrong court emphasized was “the impact on the
assets of the bankruptcy estate.”209 The court reasoned, “[T]he District Court’s
denial of confirmation will likely affect the distribution of assets between the
201

Id.
Id.
203 See id. at 281. The court stated, “If the order was not intended to be final—for example, if the order
addressed an issue that left the debtor able to file an amended plan (basically to try again)—appellate
jurisdiction would be lacking.” Id. at 283.
204 See In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court’s decision
denying confirmation of the bankruptcy reorganization plan because the plan violated the absolute priority
rule).
205 Id. at 509, 518.
206 Id. at 511 (citing In re Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d 463, 470 (3d Cir. 1998)).
207 Id. at 511 (citing In re Owens Corning, 419 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir. 2005)).
208 See id. Other courts have also used similar factor tests to determine finality, for example, in Marvel
Entertainment Group, Inc., the court considered “the impact of the matter on the assets of the bankruptcy
estate, the preclusive effect of a decision on the merits, and whether the interests of judicial economy with be
furthered.” See Marvel Entm’t Group, Inc., 140 F.3d at 470.
209 Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 511.
202
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different creditor classes.”210 It supported its reasoning by looking to an earlier
Third Circuit opinion that stated, “The most important of these factors is the
impact on the bankruptcy estate.”211 While the court in Armstrong did not
elaborate on its analysis of this factor, the court in Buncher Co. v. Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. Partnership IV provided
more insight.212 Buncher answered the question of whether a subordination
order issued by the district court was final.213 The Buncher court stated that the
impact of the order at issue on the bankruptcy estate would be significant
enough that “any substantial recovery by the unsecured creditors will be
affected by the outcome of this appeal.”214 This is a broad factor because of the
high likelihood that multiple aspects of a reorganization will be affected when
one portion is changed, thus altering the schedule for asset distribution.
The second Armstrong factor analyzes “the need for further fact-finding on
remand.”215 This factor relies on the policy argument for broader scope of
review.216 The Armstrong court determined that no additional fact finding was
necessary to analyze the decision denying the plan, and, further, that a court
was not at a disadvantage by considering the denial order when the order was
issued.217
The third Armstrong factor analyzes “the preclusive effect of a decision on
the merits.”218 Inherent in this factor are policy arguments favoring greater
efficiency and faster resolution.219 Under this factor, the court believed that the
“appeal would require [it] to address a discrete question of law that would have
a preclusive effect on certain provisions of the [p]lan.”220 This argument is
similar to arguments made by other courts that have held that an order is final
if it finally disposes of discrete disputes within the larger case.221

210

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 250
(3d Cir. 2000).
212 See id., cited with approval in Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 511.
213 Id. at 249.
214 Id. at 250.
215 Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 511.
216 See id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See id.
220 Id.
221 See, e.g., Mort Ranta v. Gorman, 721 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2013).
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The last factor the court emphasized was “the interests of judicial
economy.”222 The court reasoned that “practical consideration in the interests
of judicial economy require that we hear this appeal now.”223 This factor
directly reflects the congressional intent to promote greater judicial
economy.224
B. The Rigid Approach to Determining that the Court’s Denial of a Debtor’s
Proposed Reorganization Plan Is Interlocutory for the Purpose of Appeal
This Part begins with a discussion and analysis of the general rigid
approach to interpreting finality demonstrated in a recent case, Lindsey, in
which the court held that an order denying confirmation of a debtor’s
reorganization plan is interlocutory.225 Following a discussion of Lindsey, this
Part looks to other court decisions that influenced the Lindsey decision. It then
concludes with an analysis of courts that have utilized a rigid approach, but
that have adopted it through a methodological framework.
1. The General Rigid Approach to Interpreting Finality
Courts that take a rigid approach to interpret finality rely on traditional
interpretations of finality, rather than the more lenient interpretations used by
courts in bankruptcy, to find that plan denial orders are interlocutory.226 In
Lindsey, the bankruptcy court dismissed a debtor’s reorganization plan because
the plan violated the absolute priority rule.227 The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s decision and the debtor appealed the decision to the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals.228 After discussing the various ways that an order
may be appealed, the court determined that the order was not a final
judgment.229 Going forward, the question the court addressed was “whether the
district court’s decision—rejecting a proposed plan of reorganization—
nonetheless amounts to a ‘final’ order.”230
222

Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 511.
Id.
224 See Vickers, supra note 93; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 22, 148 (2005), as reprinted in
2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 107, 207.
225 726 F.3d 857, 861 (6th Cir. 2013).
226 Id. at 859.
227 Id. at 858. The debtor believed that the absolute priority rule did not apply to individual debtors;
“Lindsey responded that the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 abrogated
the absolute priority rule with respect to individual debtors.” Id.
228 Id. at 857.
229 Id. at 858–59.
230 Id. at 859.
223
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First, the court began its analysis by looking at prior decisions and
concluded that a district court order “is not final for purposes of § 158(d)(1)
unless the remand is ‘of a ministerial character.’”231 The court then went on to
discuss the different interpretations of finality that exist within bankruptcy
law.232 The first analysis centered on policy arguments favoring greater
efficiency and faster resolution.233 The court found that the interpretation of
finality in § 158(d)(1) should mirror the court’s interpretation of finality under
§ 1292.234 The court explained, “[W]e see no good reason to have ‘final’ ‘mean
one thing in the former cases and another in the latter.’ This straightforward
test also has the virtue of being easy to implement and resistant to timeconsuming and costly side shows about the meaning of jurisdictional
requirements.”235
Second, the court moved on to discuss the potential that an appeal may not
be required.236 Even though the court found that the debtor could not appeal
the denial of the reorganization plan, the court noted, “Far more than a few
ministerial tasks remain to be done after such a decision.”237 The court
explained that
Unless Lindsey abandons his petition, he may, indeed must, propose
another confirmation plan. Once that happens, the creditors may or
may not support the plan, the new plan may or may not require
further fact finding and the bankruptcy court may or may not exercise
its discretion to confirm the plan. Nothing about these tasks is
mechanical or ministerial or otherwise leaves only the job of
executing the judgment. Only after these positions are taken and
decisions made may a party appeal . . . .238

The court presented the debtor with an exact timeframe within which the
denial of the plan could be appealed.239 When determining whether the order
was final or interlocutory, the court relied heavily on the fact that the debtor
was free to propose a new plan and then appeal the decisions at the end of the
proceeding.240
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Id. at 859 (quoting Settembre v. Fidelity & Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 552 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Id. at 862.
See id. at 859.
Id. at 862 (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)).
Id. at 859 (quoting Settembre, 552 F.3d at 441).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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The fact that an appeal may not be required counters the reasoning used by
the Lindsey court.241 The sooner a debtor exits the bankruptcy process, the
sooner the debtor may begin moving towards financial solvency. For this
reason, it would be more efficient to resolve the issue now rather than bringing
up the issue after a new plan has already been formulated and confirmed, as the
Lindsey approach may necessitate.242 With the debtor’s first proposed plan, a
tedious process of deliberation and negotiation has already taken place.243 Both
the debtor and the creditor waste valuable time and resources when the debtor
is forced to renegotiate a new plan for the purpose of appealing the original
denial order.
Finally, the court in Lindsey touched upon the policy argument for
preserving the trial judge’s authority and discussed courts in other jurisdictions
that have held that finality in § 158(d)(1) should be interpreted flexibly in the
bankruptcy context.244 The court applied the cannon of statutory interpretation
that “[c]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
and means in a statute what it says there.”245
The court believed that Congress created flexibility in terms of appeals
when it added § 158(d)(2) to the Code under BAPCPA.246 Pursuant to
BAPCPA, “Congress gave parties and courts flexibility to certify issues for
appeal . . . .”247 The court also utilized the statutory cannon of interpretation
not to construe any section as redundant.248 The court asked, “Why certify such
issues for appeal if ‘final’ in § 158(d)(1) covers them anyway? And why add
§ 158(d)(2) to the Code in 2005 if § 158(d)(1) already did the work?”249
While the Lindsey court and supporters of a rigid interpretation argue that
the parties are free to certify the question to obtain an appeal, this may not be
entirely effective. With the enactment of BAPCPA, Congress added
§ 158(d)(2), which allows for appeals on certification if certain requirements
are met.250 However, this certification is not granted often, and “[t]he general
rule is that courts should grant leave ‘sparingly, since interlocutory bankruptcy
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250

Id. at 860; see In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 508, 511 (3d Cir. 2005).
See Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 860.
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 1, at 396–99.
726 F.3d at 860–61.
Id. at 860 (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)).
Id. at 858.
Id. at 860.
Id.
Id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (2012).
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appeals should be the exception, rather than the rule.’”251 If courts adhering to
the rigid interpretation of finality consider the availability of certification to be
the appropriate alternative to a debtor waiting until the end of a proceeding to
appeal the plan dismissal, and those courts only grant certification requests
“sparingly,” then the debtor is effectively left with no option but to wait until
the conclusion of the proceeding.
Supporters of the rigid approach to finality argue that forcing the debtor to
wait until the conclusion of the proceeding fosters the goal of preserving the
trial court’s authority.252 However, this reasoning is at odds with the
congressional intent of fostering the creation of judicial precedent behind
Congress enabling certification of interlocutory review of non-final orders.253
One of the aims of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 was to encourage the creation of judicial precedent for the lower
bankruptcy courts to follow.254 The concern was that there was not enough
guidance coming from the higher courts.255 If a court holds that an order is
interlocutory, arguing that it wishes to uphold the discretion of the trial court, it
is going against the congressional intent behind the reform of the Code.256 By
going against congressional intent, these appellate courts only exacerbate the
ambiguity over the interpretation of finality among the federal circuits.
Lindsey was not the first case to utilize the rigid interpretation of finality.
Maiorino v. Bradford Savings Bank was an decision from the Second Circuit
that exemplifies that circuit’s rigid approach to interpreting finality.257 In
Maiorino, the bankruptcy court denied confirmation of a chapter 13
reorganization plan.258 The debtor attempted to appeal this decision to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.259 Before analyzing any of the substantive
arguments about the lower court’s denial of the plan, the court first had to
determine whether it had the jurisdiction to hear the appeal.260 The court
eventually held that the order denying plan confirmation was interlocutory and
251 Vickers, supra note 93, at 524 (quoting U.S. Tr. v. PHM Credit Corp. (In re PHM Credit Corp.), 99
B.R. 762, 767 (E.D. Mich. 1989)).
252 Vickers, supra note 93, at 526–27.
253 Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 22, 148 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 107,
207.
254 Vickers, supra note 93, at 527.
255 Id. at 524.
256 Id.
257 691 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1982).
258 Id.
259 Id. at 90.
260 See id.
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not appealable.261 Thus, the court held it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
appeal.262
The court utilized policy arguments that centered on judicial economy and
the prevention of harm.263 First, the court relied on arguments favoring greater
efficiency and the preservation of the trial judge’s authority.264 The court
stated,
[W]e believe there is something to be said in a day of burgeoning
appellate dockets for taking care not to construe jurisdictional
statutes—particularly those conferring power on the parties to agree
to a direct appeal to the court of appeals—with great liberality.
Otherwise, at every stage of the bankruptcy proceedings the parties
will run to the court of appeals for higher advice.265

The court was concerned that the bankruptcy system would be inundated with
requests to usurp the decisions of the lower bankruptcy court judges if debtors
were allowed to appeal interlocutory orders.266
While the Maiorino court and other courts taking the rigid approach believe
saving the appeal until the end of a case is more efficient, not all courts
agree.267 The Armstrong court stated, “[P]ractical considerations in the
interests of judicial economy require that we hear this appeal now.”268 This
contrasts with the rigid approach rationalization relied on in Maiorino.269
Furthermore, Armstrong is one of the multiple cases that stands for the
proposition that an immediate appeal of orders denying confirmation of
reorganization plans is more efficient.270 The court in Buncher stated, “From a
pragmatic standpoint, resolution of this matter must be made at some point,
and expeditious disposition would best serve the interests of all concerned.”271

261

Id.
Id.
263 See id. at 91.
264 See id. at 90.
265 Id. at 91.
266 See id.
267 See In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2005).
268 Id.
269 See 691 F.2d at 90.
270 See Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d at 511; Mort Ranta v. Gorman, 721 F.3d 241, 247 (4th Cir.
2013); Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 250
(3d Cir. 2000).
271 229 F.3d at 250.
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Second, the Maiorino court relied on the argument that an appeal may not
be required.272 The court understood that there were times when debtors
needed a way to access a higher court.273 The court believed that Congress had
created “a safety valve” in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b).274 This safety valve is the
ability of the district courts to grant leave to the debtor to appeal to higher
courts.275 More importantly, the court recognized that debtors who have plans
of reorganization have additional remedies available.276 For example, the
debtor may propose another plan to the court.277 The court further speculated
that this newly proposed plan might be acceptable to all parties involved,
presenting an outcome that would have been prevented or delayed had the
debtor been able to automatically appeal the plan denial to a higher court.278 If
the original plan were denied, the debtor would need to offer a plan that
granted some sort of concession to the creditors in order to gain the court’s
approval.279
This argument resonates throughout those circuits that have taken the rigid
approach to determine finality.280 The Tenth Circuit reiterated this message in
Simons v. FDIC (In re Simons).281 In Simons, the court stated, “[S]o long as the
bankruptcy proceeding itself has not been terminated, the debtor, unsuccessful
with one reorganization plan, may always propose another plan for the
bankruptcy court to review for confirmation . . . .”282
The rationale suggests that a plan denial order is interlocutory and should
be so because, at the end of the case, the debtor may not want to appeal, and,
therefore, it makes more sense to follow the wait-and-see approach. There are,
however, three arguments that this approach is inefficient: (1) the debtor is not
272
273
274

See 691 F.2d at 91.
See id.
Id. Section 1334(b) states,
Except as provided in subsection (e)(2), and notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers
exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or
arising in or related to cases under title 11.

28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2012).
275 Maiorino, 691 F.2d at 91.
276 Id.
277 Id. (“[I]t is open to the debtor to propose another plan.”).
278 Id.
279 See id.
280 See Simons v. FDIC (In re Simons), 908 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1990).
281 See id.
282 Id. at 645 (citing Maiorino, 691 F.2d at 91).

VERMETTE GALLEYSPROOFS

2014]

2/17/2015 2:22 PM

INTERPRETING FINALITY IN § 158(D)

115

the only party who may appeal, (2); the law-of-the-case doctrine prevents
further appeals; and (3) the wait-and-see approach undermines the interest in
judicial economy and the prevention of harm.
First, at the end of a case, the debtor is not the only party who may appeal.
Other parties impacted by the decision have the same ability that the debtor has
throughout the proceeding to appeal. In fact, assuming the debtor relied on his
own self-interest and the proposed plan met all requirements for confirmation,
the original plan proposed should be the plan most beneficial to the debtor
because it would have the debtor ceding only the minimum amount necessary
to satisfy plan requirements. A debtor seeking to satisfy his own self-interest is
more likely to appeal the original plan denial because any plan proposed after
the initial plan will be less favorable for the debtor. The end result of the rigid
approach argument detracts from courts seeking to foster greater efficiency and
ensures that the litigation will be protracted, which is precisely at odds with
courts attempting to foster a faster resolution of cases.
Second, allowing a debtor to appeal an order denying his reorganization
plan would ensure that there would not be an appeal at the end of the case for
that issue because of the “law of the case” doctrine.283 Generally, the law of the
case doctrine works to avoid relitigation of specific disputes within a single
lawsuit.284 Whether or not the debtor is successful on the immediate appeal is
irrelevant because after the appeal, both the creditor and the debtor are barred
from relitigating the issue.285 The debtor has an incentive to compromise
because now he knows his plan has been denied and the process of negotiation
will need to be repeated.
Third, the wait-and-see approach taken by rigid-interpretation courts
completely undermines the interests of judicial economy and the prevention of
harm. One of the conclusions that can be drawn from the wait-and-see
approach is that if a plan is brought all the way through confirmation, a debtor
is less likely to relitigate the original plan denial for the sake of efficiency.286
For example, an individual chapter 13 debtor is not going to want to enter the
costly realm of appeals when his fresh start is within his grasp. This approach

283

See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 18B FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4478
(2d ed. 2013).
284 Id. (“As rules that govern within a single action, they do not involve preclusion by final judgment;
instead, they regulate judicial affairs before final judgment.”).
285 See id.
286 See Suburban Bank of Cary Grove v. Riggsby (In re Riggsby), 745 F.2d 1153, 1154 (7th Cir. 1984).
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puts the debtor at a disadvantage because the debtor is forced to agree to a
suboptimal plan.
Furthermore, if the debtor appeals on the basis of the initial plan denial
order after another plan has already been confirmed, all of the debtor’s and the
creditors’ time and money that was put into creating and negotiating the
subsequent plan would have been wasted. It is in the best interest of all parties
involved to litigate one plan at a time to ensure that the time being put into the
reorganization is as efficient as possible.
2. The Methodological Rigid Approach to Interpreting Finality
While courts in rigid interpretation circuits generally argue that plan denial
orders should be considered interlocutory, other courts have taken a more
methodological approach.287 Some courts have expanded on Maiorino’s
analysis to reject the notion that courts of appeals have jurisdiction to hear
appeals from interlocutory orders denying confirmation of a debtor’s
reorganization plan.288 These courts utilize concrete steps to determine whether
an order should be considered final.289 The basis for these approaches stems
from the arguments expressed by other rigid-interpretation circuits.290
In Lewis v. United States, Farmers Home Administration, the Eighth
Circuit utilized a three-part test to determine if the denial of a chapter 11 plan
was final for the purpose of appeal.291 The three-part test considered,
(1) the extent to which the order leaves the Bankruptcy Court nothing
to do but to execute the order; (2) the extent to which delay in
obtaining review would prevent the aggrieved party from obtaining
effective relief; and (3) the extent to which a later reversal on that
issue would require recommencement of the entire proceedings.292

The first Lewis factor, “the extent to which the order leaves the bankruptcy
court nothing to do but to execute the order,” relies on the argument that
further appeal may not be required and a policy favoring a broader scope of
review.293 The court relies on the fact that “there is no finality when the . . .
287
288
289
290
291
292
293

See Lewis v. U.S., Farmers Home Admin., 992 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1993).
Id. (citations omitted).
See id. (citing Currell v. Taylor, 963 F.2d 166, 167 (8th Cir. 1992)).
See id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Currell, 963 F.2d at 167).
See id.
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court must exercise considerable further discretion” and that a decision is not
final until the court resolves the merits of the controversy.294 Furthermore, the
court stated that “even under a liberal finality standard, the bankruptcy court
has not sufficiently resolved the issue to allow the district court to simply
affirm the decision and pass the case along to this court for appellate
review.”295 The court believed that the proceeding was not yet at a stage in the
case where the court had all of the necessary information to make an accurate
determination on the issue.296 Therefore, waiting until the end of the case
would allow the court to make a more informed ruling.297
Not all circuits agree that the information necessary to make an informed
decision is lacking at the time of denial.298 The court in Armstrong believed
that no additional fact-finding was necessary to analyze the lower court’s
decision denying the plan.299 Supporting that proposition, the court in Buncher
stated that, “because the record from the trial has been fully developed, it
appears unlikely that additional fact-finding would be required in the
Bankruptcy Court.”300 The Buncher court also agreed that there was sufficient
information for an appellate court to review the lower court’s order denying
confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization plan at the time of the order, rather
than waiting until a final order issued by the court.301
Furthermore, the court would not need any additional information to
conclude on the accuracy of a lower court’s plan denial. If the court initially
confirmed the plan, then the appellate court would not need any additional
information to hear a creditor’s appeal. All the information leading up to the
confirmation would be available for the appellate court to review. In fact,
creditors and trustees are granted the ability to appeal a plan confirmation “as a
matter of right.”302 If that same plan were denied, the debtor would be forced
to delay the appeal to the end of the proceeding. The Maiorino court stated,
“Nor do we find it strange as a matter of policy that an order confirming a plan

294 Id. (citing Schneider v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Farmers Home Admin. (In re Schneider), 873 F.2d 1155,
1157 (8th Cir. 1989); Vekco, Inc. v. Fed. Land Bank (In re Vekco, Inc.), 792 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir. 1986)).
295 Lewis, 992 F.3d at 773.
296 See id.
297 See id.
298 See In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 508, 511 (3d Cir. 2005).
299 See id.
300 Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245, 250
(3d Cir. 2000).
301 See id.
302 See Maiorino v. Branford Sav. Bank, 691 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1982).
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which would, we agree, be final, is appealable by an objecting creditor while
an order rejecting a proposed plan is not final and not appealable by the . . .
debtor . . . .”303
Following the logic of the Lewis court and analyzing it under the policy
argument for broader scope of review, two outcomes are presented.304 First, if
a debtor proposes a plan and that plan is confirmed, the appellate court would
have enough information to render a decision. Second, alternatively, if the
debtor proposes a plan and that plan is denied, the debtor would not be able to
appeal the decision because the appellate court lacks the full information to
make an informed decision.305 It stands to reason that the court would have the
same information whether the court was faced with the first or second
outcome, leading to inconsistent results.
The second factor that the court relied on is “the extent to which delay in
obtaining review [will] prevent the aggrieved party from obtaining effective
relief.”306 Applying this factor, the court in Lewis held that “delay should not
burden either party from obtaining relief.”307 Under this factor, the denial of a
reorganization plan does not prevent or burden a party from obtaining relief
because “[a]ll that is needed in this case is a final confirmation or
dismissal.”308 This argument is based on the idea that a debtor can propose a
new plan.309 Once the new plan is confirmed, an aggrieved party has the ability
to appeal the decision.310 The court believed that because the debtor could
propose a new plan, neither party is burdened or prevented from obtaining
effective relief.311
The conclusion of the Lewis court contravenes a policy favoring faster
resolution of cases in three ways.312 First, the court in Mort Ranta stated that
“postponing review of discrete portions of the action until after a plan of
303 Id.; see also Mort Ranta v. Gorman, 721 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2013) (“When a bankruptcy debtor’s
proposed plan is confirmed, we have generally allowed creditors and trustees whose objections to the plan
were overruled to appeal as a matter of right.”).
304 See Maiorino, 691 F.2d 89 at 91.
305 See Lewis v. U.S., Farmers Home Admin., 992 F.2d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 1993).
306 See id.
307 Id.
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 See id. (citing Gaines v. Nelson (In re Gaines), 932 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1991)); Simons v. FDIC (In
re Simons), 908 F.2d 643, 645 (10th Cir. 1990)).
311 See Lewis, 992 F.2d at 773 (citing Gaines, 932 F.2d at 732; Simons, 908 F.2d at 645).
312 See id.
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reorganization is approved could result in the waste of valuable time and
scarce resources.”313 This waste of time and resources is a direct harm to the
debtor who is trying to emerge from bankruptcy. The court in Mort Ranta saw
the strain on judicial economy that a delay in the appeal caused and the
resulting harm to the debtor, the creditors, and the courts.314
Second, allowing the debtor to appeal the plan denial offsets harm to both
the debtor and the creditor. Absent a remand, there are two possible outcomes
that result from allowing an appeal of an order denying confirmation of a
debtor’s reorganization plan. The appellate court can either affirm the decision
of the lower court denying confirmation, or the court can cause the plan to be
confirmed. If the debtor’s plan gets confirmed as a result of the appeal,
depending on the length of time it took for the appeal, the direct appeal may
have been faster than the debtor recreating and renegotiating a new plan. If the
plan is denied, then time is reduced from the end of the case because the debtor
will be barred from relitigating the issue.
Third, the Lewis court also neglected to consider the debtor’s exclusivity
period.315 The debtor’s exclusivity period ensures appeals will not be used as
an expensive delaying tactic. Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c), the debtor has the
exclusive ability to propose a plan for a period of 180 days from the date of
filing if certain requirements are met.316 This statute protects the debtor by
giving the debtor exclusive control over the negotiating parameters for a
certain period of time.317 If the debtor appeals the order denying a plan that he
knows is unconfirmable, the debtor risks wasting even more of his exclusivity
period time. In effect, the debtor cannot slow the process down without also
harming himself.
The third Lewis factor is “the extent to which a later reversal on that issue
would require recommencement of the entire proceedings.”318 The Lewis court
believed that treating orders denying confirmation of plans as interlocutory
would not throw a case into extensive litigation.319 The court believed that the
issue of plan confirmation did not involve a dispute of substantive facts and
that a large bulk of the proceedings took place before the issue of confirmation
313
314
315
316
317
318
319

721 F.3d 241, 246 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing McDow v. Dudley, 662 F.3d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 2011)).
See id.
See Lewis, 992 F.2d 767.
11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2012).
See id.
See Lewis, 992 F.2d at 772.
Id. at 773.
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arose.320 Additionally, the court was concerned with the threat of substantial
piecemeal adjudications, rising to the level of extensive relitigation, which the
court believed would undermine the determination of the lower court judge.321
However, other circuits have persuasively concluded that, if a court follows
the flexible approach and allows the appeal, the court is not creating piecemeal
adjudication.322 The court in Mort Ranta first made the distinction between
orders that “resolve[d] . . . specific dispute[s] within the larger case” and orders
“that are provisional in nature and subject to revision.”323 While it is plausible
to consider that the second type of orders could be abused, the first type of
orders resolve an issue that needs to be determined anyway and will have to be
addressed at the end of the case. Therefore, the appellate court does not need to
recommence the entire proceeding; rather, it merely needs to “resolve a
specific dispute.”324
C. Summary of Policy Arguments in Favor of the Flexible Approach to
Interpreting Finality for Orders Denying Confirmation of a Debtor’s
Reorganization Plan
Congress and the Supreme Court have given little insight as to how to
interpret “finality” within 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2). This uncertainty has caused
courts to perform fact-intensive inquiries that focus little on text and heavily on
policy. Due to this ambiguity, policy analysis in jurisdictions that utilize the
rigid approach to determine plan finality is in direct contrast with the policy
analysis utilized in jurisdictions that take the flexible approach to determine
finality. In the interest of judicial economy and the prevention of harm, courts
should interpret orders denying confirmation of reorganization plans as final
for the purpose of appeal for all of the reasons that follow.
First, interpreting an order denying confirmation of a reorganization plan as
final fosters greater efficiency.325 There is greater efficiency in resolving the
case with one confirmation plan sooner rather than later.326 With the debtor’s
320

Id.
Id. (citing Gaines v. Nelson (In re Gaines), 932 F.2d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1991)).
322 See Mort Ranta v. Gorman, 721 F.3d 241, 246 (4th 2013).
323 Id. (citing McDow v. Dudley, 662 F.3d 284, 286–90 (4th Cir. 2011)).
324 Id.
325 See Dicola v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re Prudential Lines), 59 F.3d 327, 331
(2d Cir. 1995).
326 See Buncher Co. v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of GenFarm Ltd. P’ship IV, 229 F.3d 245,
250 (3d Cir. 2000).
321
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first proposed plan, a time-consuming process of deliberation and negotiation
has already taken place.327 Both the debtor’s and the creditor’s time and
resources would be wasted if the debtor had to renegotiate a new plan for the
purpose of appealing the original denial order.
Second, if an order denying confirmation of a reorganization plan is
interpreted as final, it may eliminate the need for further appeal.328 Under the
wait-and-see approach, a debtor seeking to maximize his own self-interest is
incentivized to appeal the subsequent, less-beneficial plan. Then if the debtor
were allowed to appeal the denial of a confirmation order into the second level
of appellate review, once the issue was resolved, the law of the case doctrine
would prohibit any further appeals on the subject matter, disposing of a
discrete dispute within the case.329 The law of the case doctrine works to avoid
relitigation of specific disputes within a single lawsuit.330 Whether the debtor is
successful on the immediate appeal is irrelevant because after the appeal, both
the creditor and the debtor are barred from relitigating the issue.331 This would
ensure that there would be no further appeal on the plan in question.332
Third, interpreting as final an order denying confirmation of a
reorganization plan furthers a policy favoring broader scope of review.333 In
circuits that have ruled that plan denials are interlocutory, courts justify their
lack of jurisdiction as preventing the harm that would be caused by an
appellate court making a decision without all of the facts necessary to
adequately do so.334 However, this argument is flawed because, while there
may be more fact finding necessary were the debtor required to propose a new
plan, there would be no need for further fact finding if the original plan was
confirmed.335 This is because the appellate court would have all the necessary
information to make a final decision.336 The court in Taylor advocated for a
broader scope of review because it was concerned with judicial economy and
327

See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 2.
See Vickers, supra note 93, at 523 (citing In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d 26, 29
(1st Cir. 1988); Suburban Bank of Cary Grove v. Riggsby (In re Riggsby), 745 F.2d 1153, 1154–56 (7th Cir.
1984)).
329 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 283.
330 Id. (“As rules that govern within a single action, they do not involve preclusion by final judgment;
instead, they regulate judicial affairs before final judgment.”).
331 See id.
332 See id.
333 See Vickers, supra note 93, at 523.
334 See Mort Ranta v. Gorman, 721 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2013).
335 See In re Armstrong World Indus., 432 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2005).
336 See id.
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the harm that came from the limited scope of review of adjudicating claims in
pieces.337 Since all the information necessary to adjudicate the appeal of a
denied plan are present at the time of denial, the concerns related to a broader
scope of review, expressed in Taylor, are addressed.338
Fourth, an order denying confirmation of a reorganization plan should be
interpreted as final because doing so would lead to a faster resolution of
cases.339 Forcing the debtor to wait until the end of the case to appeal a plan
denial order places a strain on judicial economy and causes further harm to
both debtors and creditors.340 In the short term, the court avoids the time and
cost of an appeal; however, this approach only postpones the appeal to later.
Courts that take the rigid approach argue that the debtor may not need to
appeal because he may come to a compromise through another plan; however,
assuming the first plan was the most beneficial for the debtor, lessadvantageous, subsequent plans provide the debtor an incentive to appeal the
order anyway. By resolving the issue early in the case, courts do not need to be
concerned about the appeal being raised on the back end of the case.
Fifth, an order denying confirmation of a reorganization plan should be
interpreted as final because it does not diminish the authority of the trial
judge.341 The Court in Coopers & Lybrand was concerned that allowing the
appeal of interlocutory orders would lead to “indiscriminate interlocutory
review of decisions made by the trial judge.”342 However, the court in Mort
Ranta stated that interpreting a denial order as final “does not extend our
appellate jurisdiction but instead justifies its existing parameters.”343
Preserving the trial judge’s authority must be weighed against the
congressional intent of fostering the creation of judicial precedent. While
debtors now have the option of seeking certification of appeals directly to the
second appellate level, courts at this level rely on the rule that these

337

288 F.2d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1961).
See id; see also Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 247 (stating that “[n]othing in either of the orders indicates
that any issues concerning the proposed plan remained for the bankruptcy court’s consideration” after the plan
denial order was issued).
339 See Magic Circle Energy 1981-A Drilling Program v. Lindsey (In re Magic Circle Energy Corp.), 889
F.2d 950, 953 (10th Cir. 1989) (citing In re Commercial Contractors, Inc., 771 F.2d 1373, 1375 (10th Cir.
1983)).
340 See Mort Ranta, 721 F.3d at 243.
341 See Vickers, supra note 93, at 523 (citing Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474 (1978)).
342 437 U.S. at 474.
343 721 F.3d at 249.
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certifications should be limited greatly.344 Furthermore, if a court holds that an
order is interlocutory arguing that it wishes to uphold the discretion of the trial
court, it is going against the congressional intent behind the reform of the
Code.345 By going against congressional intent, these appellate courts only
exacerbate the ambiguity over the interpretation of finality among the federal
circuits.
Sixth, an order denying confirmation of a reorganization plan should be
interpreted as final because there are other legislative safeguards to the
bankruptcy system intended to prevent the use of interlocutory appeals as
expensive delaying tactics.346 Under 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c), Congress gave the
debtor the exclusive ability to propose a reorganization plan up to 180 days
from the date of filing, if certain conditions are met.347 Once the exclusivity
period terminates, other parties are free to propose their own reorganization
plans.348 By limiting the debtor’s exclusive period to file a plan of
reorganization, this safeguard prevents the appeal from being used as an
expensive delaying tactic. 349
CONCLUSION
The federal circuit courts of appeals are split on the finality of an order
denying confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization plan. This circuit split
impacts judicial economy and the prevention of harm within bankruptcy
courts. By blocking the debtor’s appeal to the second level of review until the
conclusion of the proceedings, the debtor is forced to attempt confirmation of a
new plan before resolving whether the initial plan was actually confirmable.
The Supreme Court in Cohen believed that an order should be considered final
if it “appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of
right . . . too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated.”350 In a bankruptcy reorganization, the ultimate goal is to achieve
plan confirmation so the debtor may begin moving towards financial
344 See Vickers, supra note 93, at 549; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 22, 148 (2005), as
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 107, 207.
345 See Vickers, supra note 93, at 549; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31.
346 See In re Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d 1000, 1003 (1st Cir. 1988); Vickers, supra note 93, at 523
(citing In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1000, 1006 (1st Cir. 1988)).
347 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (2012).
348 See id.
349 See Vickers, supra note 93, at 523 (quoting Recticel Foam Corp., 859 F.2d at 1006).
350 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
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solvency.351 Therefore, if the debtor’s goal in a bankruptcy reorganization is
achieving confirmation, then a debtor must be able to appeal a denial of its
proposed plan before the process of creating and negotiating a new plan
begins.
Allowing the debtor to appeal the denial order in this manner would ease
the burden currently on the debtor and increase judicial efficiency. Currently, a
debtor who wishes to appeal a plan denial to the second level of appellate
review is forced to go through the motions of creating and negotiating a new
plan simply to appeal the original plan. If the debtor had instead been able to
utilize the second level of appellate review after the original denial, and the
lower court was held to be wrong, both parties would save the time and money
of negotiating a new plan. If the lower court correctly denied confirmation, the
debtor would bear the cost of the additional litigation because the appeal
prolongs the bankruptcy process and keeps the debtor in the bankruptcy
system. Furthermore, knowing the original plan is now denied, the debtor has
an increased incentive to compromise in order to obtain a confirmable plan.
When considering whether to allow these appeals, the burden on creditors
should not be overemphasized. First, even if debtors were allowed this appeal,
it would not bar creditors from exercising any of their existing rights. Second,
the appeal does not impose a burden on the creditor because the debtor would
be more likely to appeal at the end of the case. The ultimate result is that the
timing of the appeal merely shifts. The temporal and fiscal burden of allowing
the debtor to appeal is levied on the debtor. The debtor’s exclusivity period
acts as a check to increase the burden on the debtor.352 By pursuing a frivolous
cause, the debtor risks running out the exclusivity period and providing
creditors and other parties the ability to submit their own less-debtor-friendly
plans to the court.
Finally, any increase in burden on federal circuit caseload should be
interpreted against the relatively low number of bankruptcy cases that are
currently appealed. In 2012, bankruptcy cases made up 1.8% of all appeals to
the circuit courts.353 In the same year, the rate of appeal from bankruptcy
courts to the first level of intermediate review, i.e., the district courts and
BAPs, was only 0.26%.354 The percentage of bankruptcy cases appealed to the
351
352
353
354

See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 2, at 612.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c).
See Hogan, supra note 52.
See Hogan, supra note 53; Hogan, Table C-2A, supra note 54; Hogan, Table B-10, supra note 54.
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second level of intermediate review was even smaller, only 0.06%.355 In
contrast, the rate of appeal for all criminal and civil cases to the circuit courts
was 11.8%.356
A majority of circuit courts considers an order denying confirmation of a
reorganization plan as interlocutory. While this result might stem from a strict
interpretation of the statute, courts have departed from this textual analysis and
created a vast body of conflicting common law on the subject.357 Courts in the
majority utilize the rigid approach to strictly determine that orders denying
confirmation of a debtor’s reorganization plan are interlocutory.
A minority of circuit courts takes another approach. Those circuits prefer a
method that fosters judicial economy and prevents harm to both debtors and
creditors. They adopt a flexible interpretation of finality to allow debtors to
appeal these reorganization plan denials when the denial order is given, rather
than forcing debtors to wait until the conclusion of the proceedings.
The outcome of the minority’s flexible interpretation is greater efficiency
for debtors, creditors, and the court; the knowledge that there will be no
appeal; a broader scope of review; faster resolution; the preservation of the
trial judge’s authority; and prevention of costly delay tactics. For these reasons,
courts should adopt the minority approach and interpret orders denying
confirmation of reorganization plans as final for the purpose of appeal.
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